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There is a growing consensus that carbon taxes will be an
essential component of the response to climate change. Most recent
carbon tax proposals provide for a domestic tax on fossil fuels at the
point of extraction with border adjustments of the tax on imports
and exports of products from energy-intensive sectors. The border
adjustment of the tax would both protect domestic industries from
unfair competition and prevent the “leakage” of emissions that
would occur if production of energy-intensive goods shifted to
jurisdictions without comparable carbon pricing. The prospect of
new import fees and export rebates, however, has raised concerns
about the potential for conflict with the rules of the World Trade
Organization.
The debate has centered on whether taxes on inputs that are
used in the production process, but are not incorporated in the final
product, may be border adjusted. The question of whether
governments may regulate imported products based on “process or
production methods” (“PPMs”) that do not affect the physical
properties of the products has played a central role in discussions of
the relationship between international trade rules and
environmental measures over the last three decades. The WTO rules
addressing the border adjustment of taxes, however, have a
different and much older provenance. Governments have border
adjusted consumption taxes for more than two centuries. The
relevant WTO rules were drafted to accommodate this practice with
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regard not only to taxes on finished products but also to taxes on
inputs used in the production process. Accordingly, border
adjustments for carbon taxes are a WTO-consistent policy tool that
can be used as part of the broader efforts to address climate change.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The accelerating climate crisis has generated growing support
for carbon pricing,1 including a statement signed by twenty-seven
Nobel Laureate economists identifying carbon taxes as “the most
cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions at the scale and speed
that is necessary.”2 Most recent proposals call for a carbon tax with
two central elements: a domestic tax and border tax adjustments on
imports and exports.3 The domestic tax would be levied on fossil
fuels (coal, petroleum products and natural gas) at a specified rate
per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (“CO2e”) “upstream” at the

1 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPPC], Global Warming of
1.5 C: An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of
strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development,
and efforts to eradicate poverty, at 95 (Oct. 2018) (“Policies reflecting a high price on
emissions are necessary in models to achieve cost-effective 1.5°C pathways”); Int’l
Energy Agency [IEA], Energy and Climate Change: World Energy Outlook Special
Report, at 135 (2015), https://www.iea.org/ [https://perma.cc/QMA8-SGW7] (“to
reach across the whole of the economy (and particularly to influence private
investors) there is no substitute for correct energy pricing, including the creation of
expectations of a rising trend in carbon prices.”); High-Level Commission on
Carbon Prices, Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, at 9 (May 29,
2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/54ff9c5ce4b0a53decccfb4c/t/59b7f2409f8dce5316811916/1505227332748/Ca
rbonPricing_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/29Z9-JQJ7]
(“[A] well-designed carbon price is an indispensable part of a strategy for reducing
emissions in an effective and cost-efficient way.”).
2 George Akerlof et al., Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends, WALL STREET
J. (Jan. 16, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/economists-statement-on-carbon-dividends-11547682910
[https://perma.cc/QUQ7-5CGZ].
3 See H.R. 7173, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (proposing a carbon fee on the use,
sale or transfer of fossil fuels for an emitting use); S. 2368, 115th Cong. (2d Sess.
2018) (proposing a fee on fossil fuels produced in the United States or entering the
United States for consumption or processing); H.R. 6463, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018)
(proposing a tax on fossil fuels produced within or imported into the United States
based on their potential for emitting greenhouse gasses). See also Brian Flannery,
Jennifer Hillman, Jan W. Mares, & Matthew Porterfield, Framework Proposal for a US
Upstream Greenhouse Gas Tax with WTO-Compliant Border Adjustments (Resources for
the
Future,
Working
Paper
Oct.
2018),
https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/framework-proposal-for-aus-upstream-greenhouse-gas-tax-with-wto-compliant-border-adjustments/
[https://perma.cc/85FT-97LP ]; JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., CLIMATE LEADERSHIP
COUNCIL, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CARBON DIVIDENDS (2017),
https://www.clcouncil.org/media/2017/03/The-Conservative-Case-for-CarbonDividends.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YA5-VESK].
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point of extraction.4
The tax would be border adjusted
“downstream” for exports by rebating the amount of the effective
tax burden that is passed through on certain products from energyintensive, trade-exposed (“EITE”) sectors. Similarly, competitive
imports from EITE sectors would be subject to an equivalent fee.5
The border adjustment of the carbon tax would address both
concerns about the effects of the tax on domestic industries and the
potential “leakage” of emissions that would occur if production of
energy intensive goods shifted to jurisdictions without comparable
carbon pricing.6 The prospect of new import fees and export rebates,
however, has raised concerns about the potential for conflict with
the rules of the World Trade Organization, particularly the
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(“ASCM”).
The debate has centered on whether taxes on inputs that are
used in the production process but are not physically incorporated
in the final product can be border adjusted.7 The question of
4 See, e.g., H.R. 7173, supra note 3, § 3 (adding Subtitle L, Chapter 101 (“Carbon
Fees”) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); S. 2368, supra note 3, § 101 (adding §
4691—”Fee for Carbon Dioxide Emissions”—to Chapter 38 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986); H.R. 6463, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 9901—”Imposition of Tax on
Combusted Fossil Fuel Greenhouse Gas Emissions”—to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986); BAKER III ET AL., supra note 3, at 1 (“The first pillar of a carbon dividends
plan is a gradually increasing tax on carbon dioxide emissions, to be implemented
at the refinery or the first point where fossil fuels enter the economy, meaning the
mine, well or port.”).
5 See S. 2368, supra note 3, § 101, at 20 (adding § 4695—”Border Adjustments
for Energy-Intensive Manufactured Goods” to Chapter 38 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986); H.R. 6463, supra note 3, § 101, Part 2 (“Tax Adjustments for Imports
and Exports of Greenhouse Gas Products”). See also BAKER III ET AL., supra note 3,
at 1:

Border adjustments for the carbon content of both imports and exports
would protect American competitiveness and punish free-riding by other
nations, encouraging them to adopt carbon pricing of their own. Exports
to countries without comparable carbon pricing systems would receive
rebates for carbon taxes paid, while imports from such countries would
face fees on the carbon content of their products.
6 See High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, supra note 1, at 41 (“Concerns
over carbon leakage and unfair competition can also be tackled by improving policy
coordination across countries and introducing so-called border carbon
adjustments.”).
7 See generally JAMES BACCHUS, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, THE
CASE FOR A WTO CLIMATE WAIVER (Jennifer Goyder et al. eds., 2017),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/NEWEST%20Climat
e%20Waiver%20-%20Bacchus_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVL2-X3M6] (noting that it
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whether governments may regulate imported products based on
their “process or production methods”(“PPMs”), and particularly
“non-product related” PPMs (“NPR-PPMs”) that do not affect the
physical properties of the product, has played a central role in
discussions of the relationship between international trade rules and
environmental measures over the last three decades.8
The issue has been raised primarily in the context of “like
product” analysis under the national treatment provisions of Article
III of the GATT. The WTO’s Appellate Body has indicated that
different NPR-PPMs generally do not render products “unlike” and
that therefore NPR-PPM-based regulatory restrictions on imported
products constitute impermissible discrimination.9 Accordingly, it
has been suggested, border tax adjustments (“BTAs”) based on the
carbon dioxide emissions associated with the production of
internationally traded products are similarly precluded because
they would result in discrimination between “like” products based
on PPMs—emissions from the production process—that do not
affect the physical composition or performance of the products.10 As
is unclear whether WTO rules permit the border adjustment of taxes based on the
amount of carbon emitted in the process of producing a product).
8 See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO:
Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 59, 59–64 (2002) (discussing the
controversy over the status of PPM-based environmental measures under the
WTO).
9 See Warren H. Maruyama, Climate Change and the WTO: Cap and Trade versus
Carbon Tax?, 45 J. WORLD TRADE, 679, 696 (2011) (“[N]either Panels nor the Appellate
Body have allowed a WTO Member to impose trade restrictions on imported ‘like
products’ that are aimed at objectionable foreign environmental practices and
production methods that do not affect the product’s actual physical characteristics
and uses and take place outside the Member’s territory.”). Article XX’s
environmental exceptions, however, permit governments to regulate products
based on different PPMs if they do so in a manner that is, inter alia, not unduly
coercive. See discussion infra Section 4.2.
10 See, e.g., Madison Condon & Ada Ignaciuk, Border Carbon Adjustment and
International Trade: A Literature Review 18 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.,
Trade and Env’t Working Paper No. 2013/06, 2013), https://www.oecdilibrary.org
[https://perma.cc/F9U6-9YHP]:
Whether or not production processes may be taken into account to
determine product likeness is crucial for [carbon tax BTA] measures.
Under some proposed schemes, cement made in China using power
generated by coal-fired plants would be subject to a higher tax burden,
than, for example, cement produced domestically using natural gas. So,
while a certain regulation on its face could seem neutral with respect to
national origin, as applied it could still systematically tax imports from a
particular country more heavily. While the WTO distinguishes between
de facto and de jure discrimination, both are illegal unless justified.
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a result of the prevalence of this view, much of the analysis of the
status of carbon BTAs under the WTO has focused on the extent to
which they could be justified under the environmental exceptions of
Articles XX(b) and XX(g) of the GATT.11
Recourse to the environmental exceptions, however, is not
necessary to establish the WTO-consistency of a properly designed
carbon tax. The text and negotiating histories of the GATT and the
ASCM indicate that internal taxes on products, including taxes
imposed on inputs into products at prior stages in the production
process, may be border adjusted on like imports and exports.
Although there has been some dispute over whether “taxes
occultes” (hidden taxes) on inputs that are not physically present in
the final product may be border adjusted, that issue was largely
resolved during the Uruguay Round negotiations through the
inclusion of language in the ASCM that explicitly permits the border
adjustment of taxes on energy and fuels used in the production
process.
Section 2 of this Article traces the history of the GATT and WTO
rules on BTAs, from the original provisions in GATT 1947 that
accommodated the long-standing practice of border-adjusting
consumption taxes on both products and their production inputs, to
the clarification in the Uruguay Round negotiations that taxes on
fuels and energy used in the production process are similarly border
adjustable. Section 3 reviews the limited GATT and WTO
jurisprudence addressing border tax adjustments. Section 4
discusses the PPM issue as it has been raised both in the context of
Article III and Article XX of the GATT. Section 5 attempts to
reconcile the PPM jurisprudence with the GATT and ASCM
provisions on BTAs and suggests some guidelines for designing
carbon BTAs to minimize the risk of trade conflict.

11 See, e.g., Michael Mehling et al., Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for
Enhanced
Climate
Action
36–40
(Claudia
Delpero
ed.,
2017),
http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CS_report-Dec-20174.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCH2-TBWX] (discussing uncertainty concerning the
consistency of carbon BTAs with GATT articles II:2(a) and III:2 and potential
applications of Article XX exceptions).
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2. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE WTO’S PROVISIONS ON
BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT
2.1. Pre-GATT Practice on BTAs
The United States practice with regard to border tax adjustments
dates back to the First Congress, which in 1789 enacted legislation
permitting the border adjustment on exports of duties on previously
imported products.12 Several decades later, David Ricardo provided
the economic rationale for border adjustment of domestic taxes on
both imports and exports, arguing that a tax on a commodity
affecting only domestic producers
is, in fact, a bounty to that amount on the importation of the
same commodity from abroad; and to restore competition to
its just level, it would be necessary not only to subject the
imported commodity to an equal tax, but to allow a
drawback of equal amount, on the exportation of the homemade commodity.13
Consistent with Ricardo’s position, commercial treaties dating
back to the 19th century have permitted the border adjustment of
indirect taxes.14 The United States briefly attempted to limit BTAs

12 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, ASSISTED BY CAROL GABYZON, FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 21–22, 37 (1996) (stating that the Whiskey
Act of 1791 similarly permitted the border adjustment on exports of an excise tax
on alcohol).
13
See DAVID RICARDO, ON PROTECTION TO AGRICULTURE 14–15 (4th ed. 1822).
See also ALICE PIRLOT, ENVIRONMENTAL BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: FOSTERING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 12–16 (Kurt
Deketelaere & Zen Makuch eds., 2017) (discussing Ricardo’s views on BTAs and
their relationship to the theory of comparative advantage).
14 See S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., TAX ADJUSTMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: GATT PROVISIONS AND EEC PRACTICES 2 (Comm. Print 1973),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015076086241;view=1up;seq=6.
[https://perma.cc/NRM5-89V5]:

Countries have traditionally imposed domestic consumption taxes on
imports. Provisions similar to those in the GATT have been used in
commercial treaties and agreements for over a hundred years and were
contained in bilateral trade agreements between the United States and
other countries from almost the beginning of the reciprocal trade
agreements program in 1934. This concept was carried over into the GATT
in 1947, as proposed by the United States and other countries, reflecting
the practical view that governments and businessmen would not have
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in reciprocal trade agreements in the 1930s, but abandoned the effort
when it proved impractical and entered into numerous bilateral
agreements that explicitly permitted the border adjustment of
internal taxes on imports.15
2.2. The GATT 1947 Negotiations
The United States continued to support the border adjustment of
internal taxes in the negotiations on the International Trade
Organization (“ITO”) and the GATT in the following decade. In
February of 1946, the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations adopted a resolution constituting the “Preparatory
Committee of the International Conference on Trade and
Employment”16 to negotiate a charter for an International Trade
Organization. The United States circulated a “Suggested Charter for
an International Trade Organization” in September of 1946, which
provided the basis for the negotiations.17
The Suggested Charter prohibited export subsidies but explicitly
permitted the border adjustment of internal taxes on exports.18
accepted procedures which exempted competing imported goods from
consumption taxes imposed on similar domestic goods.
15

See id. at n.2:

The United States inserted provisions in three early bilateral agreements
(with Brazil, Columbia and Cuba) negotiated under the 1934 Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act freezing internal taxes on imported products with
respect to which tariff concessions had been granted. Practical problems
emerged almost immediately, however, and the policy was abandoned in
1935. Subsequent agreements contained a provision permitting either
party to apply to imports a tax equivalent to any internal tax imposed on
products produced and sold domestically.
16 See Rep. of the First Sess. of the Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on
Trade and Emp., ¶¶ 3, 11, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (Oct. 31, 1946),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/33.PDF [https://perma.cc/8MFF3MRA]. The United States had called for the convening of the conference in
November of 1945. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, STATE DEP’T PUB. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR
EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, FOREWORD (Nov. 1945),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/eccles/036_04_0003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3XRL-QL8Q].
17 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, STATE DEP’T PUB. 2598, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, (Sept. 1946), reprinted
in Rep. of the First Session of the Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade
and Emp, supra note 16, at 52–67 [hereinafter Suggested Charter].
18
Id. art. 25(2):
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Similarly, the Suggested Charter contained a national treatment
provision (Article 9) that permitted the border adjustment of
internal taxes on imports so long as they were not imposed at a level
“higher than those imposed on like products of national origin . . .
.”19 Although Article 9 did not address the border adjustability of
taxes related to the production process, the issue was subsequently
addressed in the negotiations. During the First Session of the
Preparatory Committee in London, the United Kingdom proposed
clarifying that the national treatment obligation with regard to
internal taxes applied not only to taxes “imposed on” but also to
taxes imposed “in connection with” like domestic products.20 The
rapporteurs of a technical subcommittee charged with preparing a
revised national treatment article substituted the phrase “directly or
indirectly” for “in connection with” due to concerns about an
equivalent translation of the latter phrase in French.21
A Drafting Committee meeting in Lake Success, New York in
early 1947 incorporated this language in the national treatment
provision of the first draft of the GATT as a separate document from
the ITO Charter.22 Later that year, during the Second Session of the
[N]o Member shall grant, directly or indirectly, any subsidy on the
exportation of any product, or establish or maintain any other system
which results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than
the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the
domestic market, due allowance being made for differences in conditions
and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences
affecting price comparability. The preceding sentence shall not be construed to
prevent any Member from exempting exported products from duties or taxes
imposed in respect of like products when consumed domestically or from remitting
such duties or taxes which have accrued.
(emphasis added).
19
Id. art. 9 ¶ 1 (“National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation”).
20
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the Int’l Conf. on Trade
and Emp., Comm. II, Observations of the U.K. Delegation on Items 2–7 of the
Provisional Agenda of the Tech. Sub-Comm. on Customs Procedure at 1, U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/C.II/11
(Oct.
26,
1946),
https://docs.wto.org/’=gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/CII-11.PDF
[https://perma.cc/S3EE-5HNS].
21 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the Int’l Conf. on
Trade and Emp., Comm. II, Tech. Sub-Committee, 2nd mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/C.II/W.5
(Oct.
31,
1946),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/CII-W5.PDF
[https://perma.cc/C79N-CPPT].
22 See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Rep. of the Drafting Comm. of the
Preparatory Comm., 66, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34 (Mar. 9, 1947) (“The products of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be exempt from internal taxes and other internal charges of
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Preparatory Committee in Geneva, the delegate from Brazil
questioned whether the reference to taxes imposed “directly or
indirectly” would apply to direct taxes, such as corporate income
taxes, which traditionally had been treated as non-adjustable.23 The
United States delegate responded that the reference to taxes
imposed “indirectly” was intended to cover “not the tax on a
product as such but on the processing of the product . . . .”24 The
“directly or indirectly” language remained in Article III:2 of the
GATT as signed in Geneva on October 30, 1947.25
A provision included in Article II:2 of GATT 1947 similarly
reflects the understanding of the drafters that internal taxes relating
to the production of a product may be border adjusted. Article
II:2(a) states that Article II does not prevent contracting parties from
imposing on an imported product “a charge equivalent to an
internal tax imposed consistently with . . . [Article III:2] . . . in
respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from
which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole
or in part . . . .”26 The Chairman of the Legal Drafting Committee
any kind higher than those imposed, directly or indirectly, on like products of
national origin.”) (emphasis added). Similar language on national treatment is
included in Article 15:2 of the Draft ITO charter produced by the Drafting
Committee. See id. at 17. For a general discussion of the Drafting Committee’s
work, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 111–114 (2008).
23
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade
and Emp., 2nd Sess., 9th mtg. of Comm’n A in the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
Verbatim Report, at 18–19, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/9 (June 5, 1947), http://sulderivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSNID=90240083&mediaType=application/
pdf [https://perma.cc/GGX5-4YBD].
24 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
25
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 art. III:2 (“The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject,
directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”). An interpretive
note to Article III added in 1948 clarified that
[a]ny internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or
requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an
imported product and to the like domestic product and is collected or
enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other
internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to
in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of article III.
Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the Gen. Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. No. 814. III, at 104.
26
GATT, supra note 25, art. II:2(a) (emphasis added). This language had
previously been proposed by the United States as a note to be included in each
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explained that this language required that adjustments based on
taxes on the inputs of imported products must be made by reference
to those inputs rather than the manufactured product:
[I]f a duty is imposed on an article because a duty is imposed
on part of the content of this article, then the duty should
only be imposed regarding the particular content of this
article. For example, if a duty is imposed on perfume because
it contains alcohol, the duty to be imposed must take into
consideration the value of the alcohol and not the value of
the perfume; that is to say, the value of the content and not
the value of the whole.27
There has been some debate over the relationship between
GATT Articles III:2 and II:2(a) and whether they apply to the same
scope of measures.28 The text of Article II:2, however, indicates that
it is simply intended to clarify that the tariff concessions referenced
in Article II:1 do not prevent States from imposing certain other
types of charges on imported products, including border
adjustments of internal taxes (subparagraph 2(a)), “any antidumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the
provisions of Article VI” (subparagraph 2(b)), and “fees or other
charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered”

country’s tariff schedule. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Drafting Comm. of the
Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Tentative and NonCommittal Draft Suggested by the Delegation of the United States General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, E/PC/T/C.6/W.58 (Feb. 7, 1947).
27 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade
and Emp., 2nd Sess., 26th Mtg. of the Tariff Agreement Comm. at 10:30 a.m. in the
Palais des Nations, Geneva, Verbatim Report at 21, U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/TAC/PV/26
(Sept.
23,
1947),
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/yy010ry5730/90260096.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RAG7-453B]. See GATT Secretariat, Report by the Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶¶ 39-44, L/3464 (Nov. 20, 1970),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90840088.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74BZ-F8YA] [hereinafter Working Party Report].
28
See PIRLOT, supra note 13, at 12–16 (discussing alternative interpretations of
Article II:2(a) as either overlapping with Article III:2, clarifying the scope of Article
II’s tariff concessions, or applying to different types of BTAs).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/2

2019]

Carbon Border Adjustments

13

(subparagraph 2(c)). The WTO’s Secretariat29 and several GATT
panels have endorsed this interpretation.30
The prohibition on export subsidies proposed by the United
States in the Suggested Charter31 was not included in GATT 1947.
Instead, Article XVI imposed only weak notification and
consultation requirements concerning subsidies.32 Accordingly,
because it did not prohibit export subsidies, there was no need for
explicit language indicating that border adjustments of indirect
taxes on exports were permissible.33 Article VI:4, however, reflected
29 See Comm. on Trade and the Env’t, Note by the Secretariat: Taxes and Charges
for Envt’l Purposes—Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 40, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/47 (May
2, 1997) (noting that Article II:2 permits the imposition on imports of charges
equivalent to internal taxes “[n]otwithstanding the obligations set forth in the
relevant provisions of Article II (Schedules of Concessions) of GATT 1994 . . .”).
30 See Report of the Panel, United States – Customs User Fee, ¶ 70, L/6264 (Feb.
2, 1988) GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.), at 283 (1989) (“Paragraph 1(b) of Article II
establishes a general ceiling on the charges that can be levied on a product whose
tariff is bound . . . Article II:2 permits governments to impose, above this ceiling,
three types of non-tariff charges . . . .”). See also Report of the Panel, United States—
Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, ¶ 5.2.7, L/61775 (June 17, 1987)
GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.), at 136 (1987) (Article II:2(a) “clarifies” that tariff
concessions do not prevent border adjustment of taxes as provided for in Article
III:2); Report of the Panel, EEC Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, ¶ 4.16(c), L/4599
(Mar. 14, 1978) GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp), at 49 (1978):

The wording of Article II:2(a) which refers to ‘charges equivalent to
internal taxes’ is different from that of Article III:2 which refers to ‘internal
taxes and other charges of any kind’, but it appeared to be the common
understanding of the drafters of these articles that their scope should be
the same as to the kind of measures being covered . . . .
31
32

See Suggested Charter, supra note 17, art. 25.
GATT, supra note 25, art. XVI:1:

If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any
form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product
into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing
of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the
subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported
into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the
subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious
prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or
threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the
subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or
parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility
of limiting the subsidization.
33 See S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 14, at 3 (“Since the original GATT
allowed export subsidization, there was at that time no reason for the GATT to
specifically note that the exemption or rebate on exports of consumption taxes
could not be considered to be a subsidy.”)
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the understanding that rebates of indirect taxes on exported
products did not constitute subsidies, stating that such rebates or
exemptions could not be the basis for anti-dumping or
countervailing duties.34
2.3. The 1954-1955 Review Session
During the 1954-1955 GATT Review Session, Germany proposed
a new interpretive note to Article III:2 that would clarify that the
reference to “internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products” included “charges at various stages of . . . production
[including] charges borne by the raw materials, semi-finished
products, auxiliary materials, etc. incorporated in, and by the power
consumed for the production of, the finished products.”35 Delegates from
other Contracting Parties expressed a range of views on this
proposal and it was ultimately not adopted.36
The Review Session, however, did result in new provisions on
export subsidies and BTAs based on Articles 26-28 of the Havana
Charter.37 Language was added (Section B of the current Article
XVI) imposing a qualified prohibition on export subsidies on nonprimary products that resulted in their sale at a lower price than the
like product sold domestically. Significantly, the Contracting
Parties also inserted an Ad Note to Article XVI, clarifying that “[t]he
exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the
like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the
34

at 3.

GATT, supra note 25, art. VI:4. See also S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 14,

35 GATT Secretariat, Review Working Party II on Tariffs, Schedules and Customs
Administration, Report to the Contracting Parties, ¶ 10, L/329 (Feb. 24, 1955) (emphasis
added),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/L999/329.PDF
[https://perma.cc/W642-A5BS].
36
Despite its prominent role in the drafting of both Articles II:2 and III:2 to
apply to taxes imposed on the production process, the United States argued that
“internal taxes” should be interpreted to apply only to taxes on finished products.
Id.
37 See Analytical Index of the GATT: Article XVI, Subsidies, at 445,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art16_gatt
47.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PPL-H333]; U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Final Act
and Related Documents, 44–46, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Apr. 1948),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FVF-EKVH] (containing the final version of the Havana
Charter, conference resolutions, and annexed documents).
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remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those
which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.”38
Although the Ad Note does not address the remission of taxes
on the production of exported products, the adjustability of taxes on
inputs was discussed during the negotiations on the provision of the
Havana Charter on which the Ad Note was based.39 Sweden had
proposed adding language clarifying that the exemption or
remission of domestic consumption taxes, whether imposed
“directly or indirectly,” did not constitute a subsidy. It withdrew its
proposal based on an understanding that the provision permitted
the remission “of duties or taxes imposed on raw materials and
semi-manufactured products subsequently used in the production
of exported manufactured goods.”40 During the Review Session, the
Technical Group on Customs Administration similarly indicated that,
as used in paragraph 3 of Article VII of the GATT (“Valuation for
Customs Purposes”), the term “internal tax” referred not only to taxes
“levied directly on the goods directly exported” but also to taxes
levied “on the materials going into the manufacture of such goods.”41
2.4. The 1960 Report of the Working Party on Subsidies
In 1960, the Working Party on Subsidies confirmed that taxes
imposed at different stages of the production process could be
border adjusted on exports of non-primary products. The Working
Party produced a “Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of
Article XVI:4”42 that addressed export subsidies on non-primary

38
GATT, Annex A, 218, Mar. 10, 1955, 1957 U.N.T.S. 278,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20278/v278.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VQZ-B4TB]. This language was repeated in footnote 1 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
39 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, ¶ 29.
40 U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Reports of Committees and Principal SubCommittees,
at
109,
¶
18,
ICITO/1/8
(Sept.
1948),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90180096.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5JA-MQL3].
41
GATT Secretariat Review Working Party II, supra note 35, ¶ 17.
42
Contracting Parties, Working Party on Subsidies, Report of the Working Party
on
Subsidies,
4,
L/1381
(Nov.
1960),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/L1799/1381.PDF
[https://perma.cc/HV6Q-48AE].
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products.43 In its report accompanying the Declaration, the Working
Party compiled a list of practices considered to constitute
impermissible export subsidies. The list excluded remissions for
“indirect taxes levied at one or several stages on the same goods if sold
for internal consumption . . . or amounts [not] exceeding those
effectively levied at one or several stages on these goods in the form of
indirect taxes.”44
2.5. The 1970 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax
Adjustments
In 1968, BTAs received even more intense scrutiny when the
GATT Council established a Working Party on Border Tax
Adjustments.45 The United States had proposed creating the
Working Party due to concerns that, inter alia, the GATT’s rules on
border adjustment relied on flawed economic assumptions and
could provide an unfair advantage to countries that rely primarily
on indirect taxes rather than direct taxes (e.g., corporate income
taxes).46

43
The Declaration was eventually accepted by and went into force for 17
countries. See id.
44
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). See S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 14, at 4–5
(discussing the history of the “Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article
XVI:4”).
45 See Council Minutes of Meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on 27 and
28
March
1968,
8–12,
C/M/46
(Apr.
5,
1968),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/C/M46.PDF
[https://perma.cc/K6V53HJB].
46 See id. at 8–9; See also S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 14, at 1:

Some American businessmen have expressed concern that their
competitive positions, both in their home market and in markets abroad,
have been disadvantaged because other countries levy heavy
consumption taxes on imports and grant exemptions or rebates of such
taxes on their exports . . . . Although virtually all countries have a general
consumption tax system with the inevitable levy on imports and rebate or
exemption on exports, the complaints by our businessmen are primarily
voiced in terms of tax adjustments on goods in Europe - specifically the
tax-on-value added. Many of these businessmen also believe that the
direct tax burden (corporate income tax) in Europe is much lighter than it
is in the United States, and since the provisions of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permit tax adjustments on imports and
exports for consumption taxes but not for income taxes, American
producers are disadvantaged.
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The Working Party issued a report that was adopted by the
Contracting Parties in 1970.47 In its report, the Working Party noted
that although import BTAs were addressed under GATT Articles II
and III, and export BTAs under Article XVI, “differences in wording
[of the Articles] had not led to any differences in interpretation. . . .
It was agreed that GATT provisions on tax adjustment applied the
principle of destination identically to imports and exports.”48
The Working Party further observed that there was broad
agreement that indirect taxes on products (e.g., sales and value
added taxes) were adjustable whereas direct taxes on employers and
employees were not.49 There was disagreement, however, with
regard to certain “taxes occultes,” including taxes on goods and
services that are used in the production and distribution of, but not
physically incorporated into, other taxable products.50 As defined
by the OECD in an influential 1968 report, taxes occultes include
taxes on “a) auxiliary materials expended in the transportation or
production of goods (e.g. energy, fuel, lubricants, packing,
stationery); b) durable capital equipment goods (e.g. machinery,
buildings, vehicles); [and] c) services (e.g. transport, advertising).”51

47 See Council Minutes, supra note 45, at 8-9. The U.S. delegation suggested that
the Working Party could propose appropriate “new obligations or understandings”
with regard to BTAs. Id. at 9. The Working Party, however, only recommended the
establishment of notification and consultation procedures for changes in border tax
adjustment policies. See also Working Party Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 39–44.
48 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, § 2 ¶ 10. See also id. § 2 ¶ 9 (“Most
members argued that there seemed to have been a coherent approach . . . . and that
there were no inconsistencies of substance between the different provisions even if
the question of tax adjustments [on import and export BTAs] was dealt with in
different Articles.”).
49 Id. § 2 ¶ 14. In making this observation, however, the Working Party
improperly conflated the meaning of “directly and indirectly” in GATT Article III:2
with the distinction between direct and indirect taxes. See Comm. on Trade and
Env’t, Note by the Secretariat, Taxes and Charges for Envt’l Purposes—Border Tax
Adjustment, ¶ 68, WT/CTE/W/47 (May 2, 1997) [https://perma.cc/6EWG-QVBB]
(noting that the terms “directly or indirectly” in GATT Article III:2 “do not
correspond to the distinction between direct and indirect taxes . . . contrary to what
is suggested in paragraph 14 of the Working Group on Border Tax Adjustment.”).
50 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, § 2 ¶ 15(a) (defining tax occultes as
“consumption taxes on capital equipment, auxiliary materials and services used in
the transportation and production of other taxable goods”).
51
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Report
on Tax Adjustments Applied To Exports And Imports In OECD Member Countries, at 20
(Nov. 1968).
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These taxes were not usually treated as subject to adjustment,
except when implemented in the form of a cascade tax52—i.e. a tax
imposed on a product based on its value at each stage of the
production and distribution process, including the cumulative tax
burden from prior stages.53 The Working Party concluded, however,
that there was insufficient evidence of actual conflicts over the
border adjustment of taxes occultes to warrant further deliberation
on the subject.54
The Working Party further observed that even some taxes that
were viewed as adjustable raised concerns because of the difficulty
of determining the appropriate level of border adjustment. These
taxes included cascade taxes and taxes on “composite goods”
containing taxable goods. For cascade taxes, questions arose from
the typical practice of making border adjustments based on the
average tax burden of “categories of products rather than
calculating the actual tax levied on a particular product.”55 The
Working Party concluded, however, that this was an issue of
decreasing concern in light of the replacement of cascade taxes by
value added taxes (“VATs”).56 With regard to composite products,
the members of the Working Party “agreed in principle it was
administratively sensible and sufficiently accurate to rebate by
average rates for a given class of goods.”57

52
See Working Party Report, supra note 27, ¶ 15(a). The Working Party also
noted that there was disagreement over the eligibility for adjustment of “certain
other taxes, such as property taxes, stamp duties and registration duties . . . .” Id.
¶15(b).
53 Id. §2 ¶16.
54 Id. §2 ¶15.
55 Id. §2 ¶16. See also PIRLOT, supra note 13, at 194 (“[C]umulative indirect taxes
have traditionally been considered eligible for BTAs despite the impossibility of
guaranteeing a perfect equivalence between these taxes and their BTAs.
Equivalence between taxes does not need (and cannot) be established with absolute
certainty. Averaging has been an option for cumulative tax systems . . . “).
56 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, § 1 ¶ 16. See also J. ANDREW
HOERNER & FRANK MULLER, CARBON TAXES FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION IN A
COMPETITIVE
WORLD
33
(1996),
http://rprogress.org/publications/1996/swiss_1996.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GCQ-XMJU] (“By the European Commission VAT directive all
European cascade taxes were replaced by VATs no later than 1970, later postponed
to 1972.”).
57
See Working Party Report, supra note 27, ¶ 16.
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2.6. The 1979 Subsidies Code
The Tokyo Round negotiations led to the adoption of the 1979
Subsidies Code,58 which included both a broader prohibition on
export subsidies for non-primary products and an Annex containing
an illustrative list of export subsidies that excluded rebates of
indirect taxes on production inputs.59 Paragraph (g) of the Annex
indicated that the “exemption or remission in respect of the production
and distribution of exported products, of indirect taxes” does not
constitute an export subsidy unless it is “in excess of those levied in
respect of the production and distribution of like products when
sold for domestic consumption.”60 The reference to taxes on the
“distribution” of exported products—a service that is not physically
incorporated in the product—indicates that the disagreement in the
Working Party61 has been resolved in favor of treating taxes occultes
as border adjustable. Similarly, the term “indirect taxes” was
defined to include not only consumption taxes (sales, excise,
turnover, and value added taxes) but also taxes not based on the
product itself (franchise, stamp, transfer, and equipment taxes) and
“all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges.”62 Accordingly,
any tax that was not an import charge or within the narrow definition
of “direct tax” (“taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties,
and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real
property”) was treated as a presumptively adjustable indirect tax.
Paragraph (h), however, imposed certain limits on the remission
of taxes occultes when implemented in the form of cascade taxes,
referred to in the Subsidies Code as “prior stage cumulative
indirect” (“PSCI”) taxes.63 “Prior stage” taxes were defined in the
Annex as “those levied on goods or services used directly or
58 See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, LT/TR/A/3
[hereinafter
1979
Subsidies
Code],
https://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_scm_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WN5Y-6DQW].
59
See id. art. 9 and Annex. Unlike Article XVI:4 of GATT, the prohibition on
export subsidies under Article 9 did not require any showing that the subsidy
resulted in exported goods being sold for a lower price than the like product sold
domestically.
60 Id. Annex ¶ (g).
61 See Working Party Report, supra note 27.
62 See 1979 Subsidies Code, supra note 58, Annex note 1.
63 Id. Annex ¶ (h).
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indirectly in making the product,” and cumulative taxes as “multistaged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent
crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage
of production are used in a succeeding stage of production.”64
Although the reference in both definitions to taxes on “services”
used on the production process implies that PSCI taxes can include
taxes occultes, paragraph (h) prohibited the border adjustment of
PSCI taxes except for those “levied on goods that are physically
incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported
Paragraph (i) similarly prohibited the border
product.”65
adjustment on exports of import charges on goods that are used in
the production of exported goods unless they are “physically
incorporated” in the exported product.66
The limitation of export border adjustments for PSCI taxes to
those imposed on physically incorporated inputs, however, was not
absolute. The references to “allowance for waste” in paragraphs (h)
and (i)67 suggest that the requirement of physical incorporation was
not so strict that it precluded border adjustment of PSCI taxes on
inputs that, while used in the production process, were not literally
“physically incorporated” in the final product. Moreover, the term
“normal” indicates that, consistent with the 1970s Working Party’s
endorsement of border adjustments based on the average tax burden
for a category of products,68 the quantity of taxable inputs lost to
waste could be estimated based on standard production practices.
The Parties to the 1979 Subsidies Code subsequently further clarified
that “an input need not be present in the final product in the same
form in which it entered the production process” in order to be
considered physically incorporated.69
Id. Annex note 1.
Id. Annex ¶ (h); see also id. Annex note 3 (“Paragraph (h) does not apply to
value-added tax systems and border-tax adjustment in lieu thereof; the problem of
the excessive remission of value-added taxes is exclusively covered by paragraph
(g).”).
66 Id. Annex ¶ (i).
67
Id. Annex ¶¶ (h), (i).
68 See id. Annex ¶ (i) (including in the list of export subsidies, “[t]he remission
or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on imported goods that are
physically incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported
product”) (emphasis added).
69
Comm. on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Guidelines on Physical
Incorporation,
¶
3,
GATT
Doc.
SCM/68
(Oct.
31,
1985),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/TR/SCM/68.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B2HVCBQM].
64
65
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Border adjustments for PSCI taxes were subject to relatively
more restrictive treatment than the other indirect taxes covered
under paragraph (g) out of concern that they were more prone to
abuse due to the difficulty of confirming the amount of taxes paid at
different stages in the production process.70 That difficulty would
be compounded with rebates of taxes occultes, whereas taxes on
physically incorporated inputs into products would be relatively
easier to verify.71 Significantly, however, no comparable language
in paragraph (g) precluded the border adjustment of taxes on other
(non-PSCI) forms of indirect taxes on goods or services used in the
production process that were not physically incorporated into the
final exported product. The 1979 Subsidies Code, therefore,
implicitly acknowledged that non-PSCI indirect taxes on
unincorporated production inputs could be rebated on exported
products.
2.7. The ASCM
The differential treatment of BTAs on unincorporated inputs
depending on the form of the indirect tax became a subject of debate
during the subsidy negotiations in the Uruguay Round.72 India
argued that precluding the border adjustment of PSCI taxes on
unincorporated inputs “places at a disadvantage countries with
multi-stage cumulative tax systems vis-à-vis those with valueadded tax systems [covered under paragraph (g)] as in the latter,
there is no impediment to the exporter collecting full credit for all

70

See HOERNER & MULLER, supra note 56, at 32:

The purpose of forbidding PSCI taxes is to prevent nations from
subsidizing their exports through excessive tax rebates or credits. PSCI
taxes are believed to be especially prone to this abuse because it is often
difficult for a company or the government to know precisely how much
tax was paid over the various stages of production. This policy explains
the major exception to the PSCI tax ban [in the 1979 Subsidies Code]: goods
physically incorporated into the exported good. These incorporated
goods are exempted because it is usually possible to determine how much
of the taxed good is present in the final product.
Id.
See Comm. on Trade and Env’t, Negotiating History of Footnote 61 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/16, ¶ 6
(Dec. 1, 1995) [https://perma.cc/QFH2-9WH3].
71
72
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prior stage taxes paid on inputs.”73 Switzerland supported the
border adjustability of indirect taxes on unincorporated inputs,
including “charges on services, such as transportation and
communication, as well as on machinery, and on fungible inputs
such as fuel and electricity used in the manufacturing process . . . . “74
The proposal to permit border adjustment of taxes on
unincorporated inputs of both cumulative (PSCI) and noncumulative taxes was adopted in 1991 and incorporated in the text
of the ASCM.75 The revision took the form of an amendment to
paragraph (h) replacing the phrase “goods that are physically
incorporated . . . in the exported product” as defining the subject of
charges that could be border adjusted with “inputs that are

73 Negotiating Grp. on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Elements of the
Framework
for
Negotiations:
Submission
by
India,
GATT
Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG10/W/33, ¶ 4 (Nov. 30, 1989) [https://perma.cc/9J45-LW32]. See
also Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication
from India, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/16, at 4 (Feb. 1, 1988),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=164179&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&Ful
lTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSp
anishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/9CTQ-AB9H]. India had raised the issue
earlier, proposing that

rebate of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes should not be treated as a
countervailable subsidy whether or not such taxes have been levied on
goods and services physically incorporated in the exported product.
Article VI of GATT states that no product can be subject to countervailing
duty by reason of the exemption of such product from taxes or duties
borne by the like products when destined for consumption in the country
of origin. This provision clearly suggests that rebate of taxes on auxiliary
material (e.g., energy, fuel, lubricants, packing, stationary), durable capital
goods (e.g., machinery buildings, vehicles) and services (e.g. transport,
advertising) cannot be treated as countervailable subsidies.
74
Negotiating Grp. on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Elements of the
Negotiating Framework Communication from Switzerland, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG10/W/26, at 15 (Sept. 13, 1989) (emphasis added),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=164190&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&Ful
lTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSp
anishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/38GL-B8RT].
75 See Comm. on Trade and Env’t supra note 72, ¶ 3–4. The ASCM retained the
1979 Subsidy Code’s definition of adjustable indirect taxes. Compare Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, Annex I note
58,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4PB-N3CM], with 1979 Subsidies Code, supra note 58, Annex
note 1 (both defining “indirect taxes” as “sales, excise, turnover, value added,
franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all
taxes other than direct taxes and import charges.”).
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consumed in the production of the exported product.”76 Annex II of
the ASCM provides “Guidelines on Consumption of Inputs in the
Production Process.”77 Footnote 61, appended to the Annex,
clarifies that “[i]nputs consumed in the production process are
inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used in the
production process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their
use to obtain the exported product.”78 The ASCM thus explicitly
permits the border adjustment on exports of energy and fuels that
are consumed during the productions process.
3.

GATT AND WTO JURISPRUDENCE RELEVANT TO BTAS

The limited GATT and WTO case law addressing BTAs provides
further support for the adjustability of taxes on unincorporated
inputs. In the Superfund dispute,79 Canada and the European
Economic Community (EEC) challenged a U.S. tax on certain
imported substances that were manufactured using feedstock
chemicals that would have been taxed if sold in the United States.80
The panel accepted the United States’ argument that the import tax
was a BTA of the domestic tax on feedstock chemicals and therefore
was permitted under GATT Articles II:2(a) and III:2.81 Some of the
volatile feedstock chemicals subject to the border tax adjustment
76
ASCM, supra note 75, Annex II § I ¶ 1. See also 1979 Subsidies Code, supra
note 58, Annex ¶ (i) (referring to “inputs that are consumed in the production
process of the exported product”).
77
ASCM, supra note 75, Annex II; see also id. Annex III § I (reflecting the
revision in Annex II § I by referring to “inputs which are consumed in the
production process . . . .”).
78
ASCM, supra note 75, Annex II note 61 (emphasis added).
79
Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, WTO Doc. L/6175 – 34S/136 (June 17, 1987) [hereinafter Taxes on
Petroleum], https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/gatt_e/87superf.pdf [https://perma.cc/24BL-L88S].
80 See id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.1, 2.3–2.5.
81 See id. ¶5.2.8 (concluding that “to the extent that the tax on certain imported
substances was equivalent to the tax borne by like domestic substances as a result
of the tax on certain chemicals the tax met the national treatment requirement of
Article III:2, first sentence.”). See also Report of the Panel, Japan—Customs Duties,
Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, L/6216–
34S/83,
§5.8
(Nov.
10,
1987),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gatt_e/87beverg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GS5W-SR29] (noting that the reference to taxes imposed
“indirectly” under Article III:2 encompasses taxes on “raw materials used in the
product during the various stages of its production”).
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were converted to “stable and non-reacting substances”82 during the
production of the relevant imported products, indicating that there
is no requirement that inputs that are subject to the border-adjusted
tax be physically present in the same form in the final product.83
Significantly, the panel rejected the assertion by the EEC and
Canada that the BTA on certain feedstock chemicals was
inconsistent with GATT because “the pollution created in the
production of the imported substances did not occur in the United
States.”84 The panel responded that
the tax adjustment rules of the [GATT] distinguish between
taxes on products and taxes not directly levied on products
they do not distinguish between taxes with different policy
purposes. Whether a sales tax is levied on a product for
general revenue purposes or to encourage the rational use of
environmental resources, is therefore not relevant for the
determination of the eligibility of a tax for border tax
adjustment.85
The Superfund panel also provided guidance on the appropriate
approach to assessing BTAs on the inputs of imported products.
The law stipulated that the BTA would be set at the same level that
would have applied if the taxable inputs had been sold in the United
States.86 The amount of the tax would be determined based on
information provided by the importer.87 If the importer failed to
present sufficient information on the amount of the taxable
See Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 79, ¶ 3.2.11.
See Hoerner & Muller, supra note 56, at 35 (“[N]othing in the [Superfund]
Panel’s reasoning depended on the physical incorporation. Thus, this standard
should also apply to feedstock chemicals used in manufacture and not physically
incorporated . . . including taxes on energy or carbon and taxes occultes more
generally.”). See also Comm. on Trade and Env’t, Note by the Secretariat: Taxes and
Charges for Environmental Purposes—Border Tax Adjustment, WTO Doc.
WT/CTE/W/47,
¶
70
(May
2,
1997),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=6608&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullT
extHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecor
d=True [https://perma.cc/9EKV-3ULK] (“[I]t is not clear . . . whether those
[taxable] substances were still physically present in the final product, or whether
they had been exhausted in the production process, and the [Superfund] panel
made no distinction to that effect.”).
84 Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 79, ¶ 3.2.7.
85
Id. ¶ 5.2.4.
86
See id. ¶ 2.5.
87
See id. ¶ 2.6.
82
83
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chemicals used in manufacturing the imported substances, a 5% ad
valorem tax would be imposed, unless the Secretary of Treasury
issued regulations providing for the tax to be assessed based on the
amount of the taxable chemical inputs that would be consumed
using the “predominant method of production.”88
The panel indicated that the 5% ad valorem approach would
violate Article III:2 if it exceeded the tax that would be imposed on
the equivalent amount of the chemical inputs under the internal
tax.89 However, if the importer failed to provide adequate
information about the consumption of taxable feedstock chemicals
in the production process, the assessment of the BTA based on the
predominant method of production would be consistent with
Article III:2.90
Although Superfund indicates that the amount of taxable inputs
into an imported product may be averaged for purposes of
calculating BTAs, the Appellate Body’s report in India—Additional
Duties91 clarifies that the tax rates imposed under internal taxes may
not be averaged if averaging would result in BTAs in excess of the
level imposed on like domestic products. The dispute involved a
challenge by the United States to two border charges imposed by
India on alcoholic beverages and certain other products, which the
United States argued violated India’s tariff comments under Article
II.92 India characterized the charges as border adjustments of
various internal taxes imposed on domestic products, including
excise duties, sales taxes, VATs, and other local taxes.93 The
Appellate Body held, however, that the averaging of internal taxes
Id.
See Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 79, ¶ 5.2.9.
90 See Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 79, ¶¶ 5.2.9–5.2.10. This is consistent with
the position taken by the 1970 Working Party on the use of averages in calculating
BTAs for composite goods. See Working Party Report, supra note 27, § 2:
88
89

[C]ountries operating cascade systems usually resorted to calculating
average rates of rebate for categories of products . . . Other examples
included composite goods, which, on export, contained ingredients for
which the Working Party agreed in principle it was administratively
sensible and sufficiently accurate to rebate by average rates for a given
class of goods.
91 Appellate Body Report, India—Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on
Imports from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS360/AB/R (Oct. 30, 2008),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/360abr_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JVN5-B3XV].
92
See id. ¶¶ 1–3.
93
See id. ¶ 4.
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for purposes of assessing BTAs was not consistent with Article
II:2(a) to the extent that it resulted in BTAs on imported products
that exceeded the corresponding internal charges on like domestic
products.94
4.

THE PPM DEBATE

In contrast to the long history of negotiations addressing border
tax adjustments and the resulting language in the GATT and the
ASCM, the PPM debate has emerged largely from GATT and WTO
jurisprudence. The debate over PPMs reflects broad concerns about
the appropriateness of importing nations using border restrictions
to
achieve
extraterritorial
regulatory
objectives,
and,
correspondingly, the sovereign interests of exporting nations in
controlling regulatory standards within their borders.95
As
discussed below, although these concerns appear to have arisen
independent of any particular treaty text, the PPM issue has come to
be primarily associated with the question of whether products are
“like” for purposes of Article III:4 of GATT96 and whether PPMbased border measures are consistent with the chapeau
(introductory paragraph) of Article XX.97

See id. ¶¶ 208–221.
See Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction—An
Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism” in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249,
274–76 (2000) (discussing objections to PPM-based measures as inappropriate
attempts to exert extraterritorial influence over the regulatory policies of other
countries).
96 See Joel P. Trachtman, WTO Trade and Environment Jurisprudence: Avoiding
Environmental Catastrophe, 58 HARV. INT’L L. J. 273, 281 (2017):
94
95

The legal issue relating to PPMs is whether GATT/WTO law authorizes
WTO members to maintain regulatory distinctions based on PPMs of
imported products. In particular, the debate has focused on whether
products that comply with specified PPM criteria and those that do not are
“like” for the purpose of the national treatment obligations of Article III.
See also AMBER ROSE MAGGIO, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, NON-PRODUCT RELATED
PROCESS AND PRODUCTION METHODS AND THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 85–86 (2017) (discussing relevance of NPR PPMs to “like product”
analysis).
97 See Charnovitz supra note 8, at 92–102 (discussing status of PPM-based
measures under Article XX of GATT).
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4.1. Tuna-Dolphin I & II
The focus on the NPR-PPM issue as an obstacle to environmental
trade measures can be largely traced to the unadopted reports of the
GATT panels in the first round of the Tuna-Dolphin disputes in the
early 1990s. In Tuna-Dolphin I, Mexico challenged U.S. prohibitions
on the import of tuna from countries that did not adopt a regulatory
system that was comparable to the United States program for
preventing incidental harm to dolphins and other marine mammals
from fishing, or from intermediary countries that imported tuna
from countries subject to the primary ban.98 Mexico argued that the
import bans constituted quantitative restrictions in violation of
Article XI of GATT.99 Moreover, domestic and imported tuna were
“like products” and it was not permissible under Article III of GATT
to distinguish between them based on their production processes.100
The United States countered that the ban on imported products was
simply an enforcement of the domestic restrictions on harvesting
tuna, as permitted under Article III:4 and the Note Ad Article III,
and therefore not covered under Article XI.101
The panel sided with Mexico, although it did not explicitly frame
its analysis in terms of the “like product” issue.102 The panel instead
indicated that regulations addressing the process for harvesting
tuna “could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products as
such because they would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and
could not possibly affect tuna as a product.”103 Accordingly, the panel
concluded, the import prohibitions did not qualify as “internal
98 See Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WTO
Doc. DS21/R - 39S/155, ¶¶ 2.1–2.9, 5.1–5.5 (Sept. 3, 1991) [Hereinafter Report on
Tuna-Dolphin
I],
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gatt_e/91tuna.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8U6V-P5RE].
99 Id. ¶¶ 3.1–3.2, 3.10.
100 Id. ¶ 3.16.
101 Id. ¶¶ 3.6–3.7, 5.8. The Note Ad Article III states that any internal tax or
regulation that applies to both domestic and imported “like” products and is
enforced with regard to the imported product at the time of importation shall be
treated as an internal tax or regulation subject to Article III. See GATT, supra note
25, Annex I, Ad Article III.
102 See Howse & Regan, supra note 95, at 254 (“The Tuna/Dolphin I panel’s
argument is by no means clear, since the panel introduces without definition the
notion of measures ‘affecting products as such’ and the notion of how a measure
affects a product ‘as a product’ . . . [t]he panel does not focus on the issue of ‘like’
products . . . .”).
103 See Report on Tuna-Dolphin I supra note 98, ¶ 5.14 (emphasis added).
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regulations” covered under Article III:4 and the Note ad Article III,
and instead were prohibited quantitative restrictions under Article
XI. 104
The panel similarly stressed that the embargoes were based on
the production process rather than the product itself in rejecting the
United States’ assertion that the measures were permissible under
the environmental exceptions in Article XX of GATT.105 Article
XX(b) applies to measures “necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health” and Article XX(g) covers measures “relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption . . . .” The panel cautioned that if the
exceptions could be applied to measures based on production
processes outside the jurisdiction of the country, “each contracting
party could unilaterally determine the conservation policies from
which other contracting parties could not deviate without
jeopardizing their rights under the [GATT].”106
Three years later another GATT panel reached similar
conclusions regarding the tuna embargoes in a dispute brought by
intermediary countries (the Netherlands and the European
Economic Community). 107 In Tuna-Dolphin II, the panel found that
Article III and the Note ad Article III did not cover the embargoes
on tuna because they were based on the harvesting methods for the
tuna and “none of these practices, policies and methods could have
any impact on the inherent character of tuna as a product.”108
Accordingly, the panel concluded—like the panel in Tuna-Dolphin
I—that the embargoes were quantitative restrictions covered by and
inconsistent with Article XI:1.109
The panel, however, took a different approach in rejecting the
application of the Article XX exceptions, stressing the coercive
nature of the embargoes rather than their extraterritorial reach. On
the latter issue, the panel indicated that there was “no valid reason
supporting the conclusion that the provisions of Article XX(g) apply
Id., ¶¶ 5.14, 5.17–18, and 5.35 – 36.
Id., ¶¶ 5.23–34.
106 Id., ¶¶ 3.40, 5.23, 5.32.
107
Report of the Panel, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WTO Doc.
DS29/R (June 16, 1994), [Hereinafter Report on Tuna-Dolphin II]
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gatt_e/92tuna.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QQQ-MCAL].
108
Id. ¶ 5.9.
109
Id. ¶ 5.10.
104
105
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only to policies related to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources located within the territory of the contracting party
invoking the provision.”110 The panel reached a similar conclusion
with regard to Article XX(b).111 The panel found, however, that the
tuna embargoes were outside the scope of both Article XX(b) and
XX(g) because they were intended to coerce other countries to
change their conservation policies, which the panel viewed as
fundamentally inconsistent with the GATT’s role as a multilateral
framework for guaranteeing market access to the contracting
parties.112
The focus of the panels in Tuna Dolphin I and Tuna Dolphin II on
the lack of effect of the production process on the tuna “as a
product” has been widely interpreted as indicating that different
NPR-PPMs do not make products “unlike” for purposes of Article
III of the GATT. The approach currently taken by the Appellate
Body in assessing likeness, however, is arguably at least somewhat
more accommodating of PPM-based regulatory distinctions.
Although the Appellate Body has noted that the assessment of
likeness under Article III is ultimately “a determination about the
nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among
the products,”113 it may consider a number of factors—including
consumer preferences—in making that assessment.114
Id. ¶ 5.20.
Id. ¶¶ 5.30–33.
112 Id. ¶¶ 5.23–27, 5.36–39.
113
Appellate Body Report, Philippines—Taxes on Distilled Spirits, ¶ 119, WTO
Doc. WT/DS396/AB/R, WT/DS403/AB/R (adopted Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter
Philippines—Distilled
Spirits],
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds403/ab/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerS
criptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/93Q2-E6HS]. In
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter
EC-Asbestos],
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds135/ab/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerS
criptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/LCB4-KGZM], the
Appellate Body suggested that the standard for likeness was narrower under
Article III:2 than Article III:4 (¶¶ 93–6), and that the likeness inquiry under the latter
provision should focus on the existence of a competitive relationship between the
products (¶ 99). In Philippines—Distilled Spirits, however, the Appellate Body
indicated that the likeness analysis under Article III:2 should similarly focus on the
products’ competitive relationship.
114
The relevant factors include “the product’s end-uses in a given market;
consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the product’s
110
111
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Under this approach, the NPR-PPM of an imported product is
generally an insufficient basis to deem it to be non-like a competitive
domestic product and therefore subject to less favorable regulatory
treatment. At least in theory, however, NPR-PPMs could support a
finding of non-likeness if they had a sufficient impact on consumer
preferences with regard to otherwise competitive imported and
domestic products.115
4.2. Shrimp-Turtle I & II
The Appellate Body has been even more accommodating of
NPR-PPMs under Article XX, rejecting the Tuna-Dolphin II panel’s
suggestion that any border measures contingent on the production
processes of an exporting country are fundamentally incompatible
with Article XX. In its reports in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute, the
Appellate Body established a more nuanced approach that focuses
on two factors in assessing the consistency of PPM-based border
measures with Article XX: (1) whether they are contingent on the
actions of governments or private market actors, and (2) whether
they require adoption of particular production processes or merely
achievement of certain standards of protection.116
The Shrimp-Turtle dispute involved a challenge by India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand to a U.S. ban on the importation of
shrimp from countries that did not require the use of “turtle
excluder devices” (“TEDs”) to prevent sea turtles from being killed
properties, nature[,] and quality . . . [and the product’s] tariff classification . . . .”
Philippines—Distilled Spirits, supra note 113, ¶ 118 n.210.
115 See Trachtman, supra note 96, at 281:
The implication of the competition-based approach to “likeness” is that,
unless consumers distinguish between products on the basis of the PPM,
differences in PPMs are unlikely to render products “un-like.” For
example, in the case of carbon regulation, unless consumers distinguish
between products on the basis of the amount of carbon used in their
manufacture, high carbon-intensity and low carbon-intensity products
would be treated as like products.
See also Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New
Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 489, 513
(2002) (“For Article III:4 purposes, no particular physical characteristic is
dispositive, in the abstract, of whether a product is ‘like’ or unlike. Other factors,
such as consumer preferences, must be considered in forming a judgment based on
the criteria that the Appellate Body approved . . . .”).
116 See infra notes 122–143 and accompanying text.
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in the nets of shrimp boats.117 The panel found that the import ban
constituted an impermissible quantitative restriction under Article
XI of the GATT that was not justified under Article XX(b) or (g),
citing Tuna-Dolphin II in support of its conclusion that permitting
one country to restrict market access in order to coerce another
country to adopt certain policies would threaten the multilateral
trading system.118
On appeal, the Appellate Body noted that assessment of a
measure under Article XX requires a “two-tiered” analysis.119 First,
the measure must be “provisionally justified” in that it is within one
of the specific exceptions provided for in paragraphs (a) through (j)
of Article XX.120 Second, the measure must comply with the chapeau
of Article XX, which states that measures must not be “applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade . . . .”121
The Appellate Body found that the import ban was provisionally
justified under Article XX(g) and reversed the panel’s finding that
the measure was a priori excluded from Article XX because it made
access to the U.S. shrimp market contingent on the adoption of
certain policies designed to protect sea turtles.122 The Appellate
Body observed in paragraph 121 of its report that the test applied by
the panel had no basis in the text of Article XX, and noted further
that
conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market on
whether exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy
117 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 1–5, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12,
1998)
[hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle
I
AB
Report],
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds58/ab/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerSc
riptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/6VKB-VQHR].
118
See Report of the Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 7.43–46, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (adopted May 15, 1998),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds58/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScript
edSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/RPF7-FC99].
119 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶ 118 (quoting Appellate Body
Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO
Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996), at 22).
120 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶ 125.
121
See GATT, supra note 25, art. XX.
122
See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶¶ 112–22.
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or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member
may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures
falling with the scope . . . of Article XX. . . . It is not necessary
to assume that requiring from exporting countries
compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies . . .
prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a
priori incapable of justification under Article XX. Such an
interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific
exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the
principles of interpretation we are bound to apply.123
Yet despite rejecting the panel’s suggestion that a WTO Member
may not condition market access on another Member’s adoption of
certain policies, the Appellate Body concluded that the turtle
protection measure had been implemented in a manner that
constituted “unjustifiable discrimination” under the chapeau of
Article XX.124
“Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw in this measure’s
application,” the Appellate Body stated, was “its intended and
actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions made by
foreign governments,” which effectively required all other WTO
Members attempting to export shrimp to the United States “to adopt
essentially the same policy . . . as that applied to, and enforced on,
United States domestic shrimp trawlers.”125 This coercive approach
precluded even imports of shrimp harvested using TEDs if those
shrimp were harvested in the waters of countries that had not been
certified as requiring the use of TEDs.126 The Appellate Body
indicated that the focus on the adoption of the particular regulatory
approach rather than allowing for “flexibility” in achieving the
policy goal of protecting sea turtles resulted in unjustified
discrimination because it did not “allow for any inquiry into the
appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions
prevailing in . . . exporting countries.”127
Id. ¶ 121.
Id. ¶¶ 161-176.
125 Id. ¶ 161.
126 Id. ¶ 165.
127 Id. The Appellate Body also found the application of the import ban to
constitute unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau because the United States
had failed to attempt to negotiate an approach to the conservation of sea turtles
with all affected countries (¶¶ 166–72) and had provided some countries with
longer periods for implementing the required use of TEDs (¶¶ 173–4) and greater
access to relevant technology (¶ 175). The Appellate Body further concluded that
123
124
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The apparent tension between the Appellate Body’s statements
on PPM-based measures in Shrimp-Turtle I was clarified in the
subsequent compliance proceeding. The United States issued
revised guidelines implementing the import ban, which permitted
shrimp to be imported not only from countries that required the use
of TEDs on shrimp trawlers, but also from countries with policies
for protecting sea turtles that were “comparably effective” to the use
of TEDs.128
Before the panel in the compliance proceeding, Malaysia argued
that the revised guidelines continued to violate Article XI and were
not justified under Article XX(g).129 The panel agreed that the
revised guidelines violated Article XI but found that they were
sufficiently flexible and non-coercive to be justified under Article
XX(g).130 The panel noted that the revised guidelines permitted not
only the importation of shrimp from countries certified as having
implemented a program for protecting sea turtles that achieved a
comparable level of protection to the mandatory use of TEDs,131 but
also shrimp caught with TEDs from countries that were not
certified.132
The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the revised
guidelines, by permitting certification of countries with sea turtle
protection programs that were “comparable in effectiveness” to the
U.S. policies, were sufficiently flexible to avoid constituting
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau of
the ban had been applied in a manner that constituted impermissible “arbitrary
discrimination” under the chapeau, due to its inflexible implementation (¶ 177) and
the lack of “basic fairness and due process” in the process for certifying countries
as complying with the turtle protection standards (¶ 181).
128
See Report of Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, ¶ 2.28, WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle II Panel Report],
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=
(@Symbol=%20wt/ds58/rw*%20not%20rw2*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=F
omerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/UBR3-SQJS].
129 Id. ¶ 5.2.
130 Id. ¶¶ 5.89–5.107.
131 Id. ¶¶ 5.90–5.104.
132 Id. ¶¶ 5.105–5.111. The panel also concluded that the revised regulation
addressed the Appellate Body’s concerns noted supra in note 127 regarding the
United States’ failure to attempt to negotiate a multilateral approach to protecting
sea turtles with all affected countries (¶¶ 5.30–5.88), the discriminatory phase-in
periods (paras. 5.112–5.116) and approach to technology transfers (¶¶ 5.117-5.120),
and the lack of due process in determining compliance with the guidelines (¶¶
5.126–5.136).
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Article XX.133 Significantly, in reaching this conclusion, the
Appellate Body quoted its language in paragraph 121 of the original
proceeding,134 noting that measures protected under Article XX
would frequently involve conditioning market access on policies
prescribed by the importing country.135 This statement, the
Appellate Body indicated, “expresses a principle that was central to
our ruling in United States—Shrimp.”136
Taken together, the Appellate Body’s reports in the Shrimp—
Turtle dispute can be read to suggest that PPM-based measures can
be divided into four tiers of increasing flexibility for the purposes of
assessing their compliance with the chapeau of Article XX:
(1) measures that require exporting countries to adopt policies
mandating the use of certain PPMs;
(2) measures that require exporting countries to adopt policies
that are comparably effective in achieving the level of
protection of the importing country’s domestic program,
without mandating the use of particular PPMs;
(3) measures that require producers in the exporting country to
use certain PPMs, regardless of whether they are mandated
by the government of the exporting country, and
(4) measures that require producers in the exporting country to
achieve a certain standard of protection comparable to the
standard achieved by importing country’s domestic
program, without requiring either that the exporting
government mandate or that the producer use particular
PPMs.
Tier 1 measures, such as the original guidelines rejected by the
Appellate Body in Shrimp Turtle I, are generally incompatible with
the chapeau of Article XX.137 The status of Tier 2 measures that
require only that the government of the exporting country achieve a
133 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia ¶¶ 135–
150, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter ShrimpTurtle II AB Report]. The Appellate Body indicated that the compliance of the
revised guidelines with the chapeau was contingent on the United States’ “ongoing
serious good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement.” Id. ¶ 151.
134 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶ 121.
135
See Shrimp-Turtle II Panel Report, supra note 128.
136 Shrimp-Turtle II AB Report, supra note 133, ¶ 138.
137
Conceivably a Tier 1 measure could be justified under the chapeau if it was
based on an adequate assessment of the appropriateness of a particular regulatory
approach for the exporting country. See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying
text.
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comparable level of protection, such as the revised guidelines
approved by the Appellate Body in Shrimp—Turtle II, is less clear.
The panel in Shrimp—Turtle II indicated that the revised guidelines
were only compliant with the chapeau because they also included a
Tier 3 provision—i.e. they permitted the importation of TED-caught
shrimp from countries that had not been certified as having a sea
turtle protection program comparably effective to that of the United
States.138
Yet, as Robert Howse has noted, the Appellate Body in Shrimp—
Turtle II did not indicate that permitting shipment-by-shipment
certification of turtle-safe shrimp was required for the revised
guidelines to comply with the chapeau.139 The United States had not
appealed the panel’s finding on the need to permit the importation
of TED-caught shrimp from non-certified countries, and the
Appellate Body did not rely on this aspect of the revised guidelines
in determining that they were adequately flexible to satisfy the
chapeau.140 Howse argues that requiring shipment-by-shipment
certification of compliance with a NPR PPM-based standard would
be incompatible with the Appellate Body’s assertion in paragraph
121 of Shrimp—Turtle I, reiterated in Shrimp—Turtle II, that measures
that are justified under Article XX frequently “condition[] access to
a Member’s domestic market on whether exporting Members
comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by
the importing Member . . . .”141
If paragraph 121 is read to refer to Tier 1 measures, it is difficult
to reconcile with the Appellate Body’s finding in Shrimp—Turtle I
that the original guidelines were impermissibly inflexible and
coercive precisely because they conditioned market access on the
adoption by exporting countries of specific policies regarding the
protection of sea turtles.142 A possible alternative interpretation is
that the reference in paragraph 121 to “policy or policies unilaterally
prescribed by the importing Member” encompasses Tier 2
measures, i.e. policies framed in terms of achieving a particular
138 See Shrimp-Turtle II Panel Report, supra note 128, ¶ 5.111 (“[W]e consider that
the United States, by modifying its guidelines and adjusting its practice so as to
permit import of TED-caught shrimp from non-certified countries complies, as long
as that situation remains, with the DSB recommendations and rulings in this
respect.”).
139 See Howse, supra note 115, at 511–512.
140 Id. at 512.
141 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶ 121.
142 See Shrimp-Turtle II AB Report, supra note 133, ¶ 137.
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standard of protection. Conditioning market access on the adoption
of regulatory mandates by the exporting company may in theory be
compatible with the chapeau of Article XX, but it may also be
deemed impermissibly inflexible and coercive if the same standard
of protection could be achieved under an alternative regulatory
program. Under this approach, a Tier 2 measure could be
considered consistent with the chapeau given that it would
represent a less coercive alternative to requiring the exporting
country to adopt a specific regulatory approach.
Regardless of how paragraph 121 is interpreted with regard to
Tier 2 measures, both the panel and Appellate Body reports in the
Shrimp—Turtle dispute indicate that Tier 3 measures, requiring
producers in the exporting country to use certain PPMs without
requiring the government of the exporting country to adopt any
regulatory program, are generally permissible under the chapeau.143
And Tier 4 measures, which simply require that exporters meet
certain non-product related performance standards comparable to
those of the importing country, provide for maximum flexibility and
the lowest level of intrusion on exporting Members’ sovereignty and
accordingly are compatible with the chapeau.
5. CARBON BTAS AND THE PPM ISSUE
Despite the prominent role the PPM issue has played in the
Appellate Body’s jurisprudence addressing environmental
measures, it should not constitute a significant obstacle to the
development and implementation of WTO-consistent carbon taxes.
As discussed below, GATT Articles II:2(a) and III:2 and the ASCM
explicitly permit the border adjustment of taxes on inputs used in
the production process of “like” products. Similarly, Article XX’s
exceptions apply to measures—like properly designed carbon
BTAs—that are based on the production processes of imported
products, so long as the measures are sufficiently flexible and do not
coerce the exporting countries to adopt policies mandating the use
of specific PPMs.

143

See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
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5.1. Carbon BTAs and “Like Product” Doctrine
The PPM doctrine that has emerged from the WTO’s GATT
jurisprudence should have limited implications for BTAs on carbon
taxes. As discussed in Section 2, the text of GATT Article II:2(a)
permits the adjustment of indirect taxes not only on “like” imported
products, but also on “articles from which” the like imported
products have been produced. Article III:2 similarly permits the
adjustment of indirect taxes imposed not only directly on like
products, but also imposed “indirectly,” reflecting the intent of the
drafters to protect the longstanding practice of border-adjusting
consumption taxes, including taxes on different stages of the
production process.144
Accordingly, a country imposing a carbon BTA on an imported
product would not need to demonstrate that the production
processes for the imported and domestic products subject to the tax
rendered them “unlike” and therefore subject to different treatment.
Instead, it would simply assert its right to border adjust on imports
the taxes imposed “indirectly” (i.e. through taxes on a production
input) on like domestic products. As reflected in the Superfund panel
report, the focus of the inquiry under GATT Articles II:2(a) and III:2
with regard to a carbon BTA would not be on the likeness of the
manufactured products, but rather whether the BTA on the
imported product is assessed at a level that exceeds the tax on the
domestic product.145 The ASCM is even more explicit with regard
to export BTAs, permitting the border adjustment of taxes on both
incorporated and unincorporated inputs used to produce like

See supra Section 2.2.
See Joost Pauwelyn, Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments
under WTO Law, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH & THE WTO 448,
489 (Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost eds., 2013) (“[I]t would be rather odd for
the WTO to intervene in this question of differentiating between types of steel
depending on their carbon footprint, once the WTO has earlier accepted that carbon
taxes or regulations can be adjusted at the border. In the US—Superfund case . . .
the panel never questioned whether (taxed) imports produced with the chemicals
were ‘like’ US products not produced with the chemicals.”). See also Ross Astoria,
Design of an International Trade Law Compliant Carbon Border Tax Adjustment, 6 ARIZ.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 491, 506 (2015) (“It seems likely that the panel in [U.S.]—
Superfund implicitly assumed that the domestic and imported chemical products
were like (because of their identical chemical composition), observed that the tax
rate on the precursor chemicals was equivalent, and therefore felt no need to inquire
further.”).
144
145
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products, including “energy, fuels[,] and oil used in the production
process . . . .”146
Thus, the NPR-PPM issue plays out very differently with regard
to regulatory and tax issues. Border adjustment of NPR-PPM
regulatory standards is generally prohibited under the like product
jurisprudence (although potentially permissible under GATT
Article XX). In contrast, border adjustment of NPR-PPM based taxes,
i.e. taxes on prior stages in the production process, is expressly
permitted under the language of the ASCM and Articles II:2(a) and
III:2 of the GATT, so long as those taxes are not assessed at a higher
level than the taxes borne by like domestic products.147
Conceivably, even a BTA that did not impose a rate that was in
excess of the rate borne by the like domestic product could be subject
to challenge on the grounds that, due to the higher CO2e emissions
associated with the production of an imported product, it was
subject to a higher effective tax burden than the domestic like
product.148 It is unclear, however, whether a higher tax burden on
an imported product that results from the consumption of a higher
amount of taxable inputs in the production process would be found
to violate Article III:2. Such a finding would significantly impair the
right of WTO Members under Articles II:2(a) and III:2 to border
adjust indirect taxes on inputs in the production process.149 It would
also disrupt the parallel treatment of import and export BTAs.150
Although export BTAs are now covered under the ASCM in
addition to GATT, both GATT and the ASCM are “integral parts” of
the WTO Agreement, and their provisions concerning border
adjustment of taxes should presumably be interpreted in a

See ASCM, supra note 75, at n.61.
See supra Sections 2.2 and 2.6-2.7.
148 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Certain Measures Concerning Taxation
and Charges, ¶ 5.35., WTO Doc. WT/DS472/AB/R, WT/DS497/AB/R (adopted
Dec.
13,
2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/472_497abr_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E56D-PHY] (“A determination of whether an infringement of
Article III:2, first sentence, exists must be made on the basis of an overall assessment
of the actual tax burdens imposed on imported products, on the one hand, and like
domestic products, on the other hand.”).
149 See Working Party Report, supra note 27.
150 See Working Party Report, supra note 27 and accompanying text
(discussing the consensus of the 1970 Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments
that the same principles applied to import and export BTAs despite their coverage
under different provisions of GATT).
146
147
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consistent manner.151 And even if an import BTA of a carbon tax
were found to violate GATT due to a higher effective tax burden
based on greater CO2e emissions resulting from its production
process, it could still be justified under the environmental
exceptions provisions of Article XX of GATT.
5.2. Carbon BTAs and the Chapeau of Article XX
As discussed supra in Section 4, the PPM issue has been
implicated under the chapeau of Article XX primarily in the context
of the Appellate Body jurisprudence indicating that border
measures must be flexible and not coerce exporting countries into
adopting specific PPM-based regulatory programs. A carbon tax
BTA would be consistent with this principle because it would not be
a Tier 1 measure that required exporting countries to adopt
particular PPM-based regulations. Rather, it would be a leastcoercive Tier 4 approach,152 simply assessing the BTA on imported
products from EITE sectors based on the amount of CO2e associated
with the products’ production, regardless of what specific PPMs the
manufacturer used to achieve that level of emissions (e.g., energy
efficiency, different mixtures of energy sources, etc.)153
5.3. Calculating the BTAs
In calculating the BTAs for a carbon tax, the rate applied must
not exceed the rate applied domestically.154 Some latitude is
permissible, however, in determining the relevant amount of CO2e
associated with a product subject to the BTA.155
The approach that presents the lowest risk of trade conflict
would be to use reliable data provided by exporters and importers
regarding the CO2e emissions associated with the production of the
151 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, art. II:2 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (the
Multilateral Trade Agreements included in Annexes 1–3 of the Marrakesh
Agreement, including the GATT and the ASCM, “are integral parts of this
Agreement . . . .”)
152 See supra Section 4.2.
153 Id.
154 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
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relevant product.156
Where such data is unavailable, the
government assessing the BTA may determine the relevant amount
of CO2e subject to the price/ton CO2e by reference to the average
emissions associated with the “predominant method of production”
for the product.157
Some proposals have called for simply assessing BTAs at the
same amount on imported products as the average amount imposed
on like domestic products.158 This approach, however, would likely
violate GATT Article III:2 (and therefore not be protected under
II:2(a)) if the imported products were in fact manufactured with
lower associated CO2e emissions, given that it would result in an
impermissibly higher rate/ton CO2e.159 An import BTA regime
relying on domestic average emissions for a product, accordingly,
would need to permit importers to petition for a lower BTA based
on lower CO2e emissions.
Export BTAs for products from EITE sectors could be based on
national averages for the relevant products. To the extent that a
manufacturer could demonstrate that it used a more energyintensive process than the average and that its products therefore
bore a higher effective carbon tax burden, it would in theory be
permissible to assess an export BTA at a level higher than the
average so long as it did not exceed the actual carbon taxes borne by
the product.160 This would, however, be inconsistent with the policy
objectives of the carbon tax in that it could incentivize higher CO2e
production processes for exported products.
Conversely, use of national averages could over-compensate
exporters of products produced with lower than average CO2e
See supra notes 87–89 accompanying text.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text. See also Working Party Report,
supra note 27, ¶ 16 (explaining that average amounts of inputs may be used to
calculate BTAs for composite goods); Pauwelyn, supra note 145, at 488–91 (noting
that in the absence of specific information from manufacturers, import BTAs may
be assessed based on the predominant method of production).
158 See,
e.g.,
H.R.
6463,
115th
Cong.
(2018),
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr6463/BILLS-115hr6463ih.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VU4F-MWR4], at 28 (amending the Internal Revenue Code to
add the following as Section 9912(2): “The term ‘border tax adjustment’ means the
levying of a tax on imported covered goods equivalent to the amount of tax paid
pursuant to part 1 of this subtitle in the manufacture of comparable domestic
manufactured goods . . .”).
159 See Astoria, supra note 145, at 514–15 (assessing carbon BTAs based on tax
borne by like domestic products would violate GATT Article III:2 if it resulted in a
higher rate of taxation).
160 See supra notes 58–78 and accompanying text.
156
157
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emissions and therefore potentially constitute impermissible export
subsidies under the ASCM. Such over-compensation, however,
would, in the aggregate, be offset by the under-compensation for
exports of higher-CO2e products. Moreover, as a policy matter, it
would presumably encourage lower-CO2e production processes.
6.

CONCLUSION

The PPM issue has dominated discussions of the relationship
between trade rules and environmental measures since the first
Tuna-Dolphin panel report was issued in 1991. The WTO rules
addressing the border adjustment of indirect taxes, however, have a
different and much older provenance. Governments have border
adjusted consumption taxes for more than two centuries. Articles
II:2(a) and III:2 of GATT 1947 were drafted to accommodate this
practice with regard not only to taxes on finished products but also
taxes on inputs used in the production process. The lingering debate
over the border adjustment of taxes occultes on energy and other
inputs that are consumed in the production process was resolved in
the 1995 ASCM.
Accordingly, properly designed border
adjustments for carbon taxes are a WTO-consistent policy tool that
can be used as part of the broader efforts to address the defining
environmental challenge of our time.
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